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INTRODUCTION
This paper responds to the request we received from the conference organizers to produce a piece on the environmental regime in developing countries. By regime, we mean those environmental externalities that are commonly found in the developing world, along with the policy responses, if any, to these. Included are the direct effects of industrial emissions, air and water quality impacts of untreated waste (industrial and human waste), congestion effects of traffic, soil erosion, and open access resource problems (including forests).
We note the many difficulties involved with adequately characterizing this regime, not the least of which is the heterogeneity across both environmental problems and policy responses in the developing world. Enforcement and compliance (which are typically lax in developing countries) also play a central role in defining this regime. In addition, we note the differences between developed and developing country experience more generally beyond the environmental area.
In the paper we make three main points. The first is that there is a tendency in much literature of the last few years to equate environmental problems in developing countries with pollutants (or emissions). Such an approach has been partly influenced by data availability, including that collected by the Global Environmental Monitoring System (GEMS) supported by UNEP. This has yielded data on a range of environmental indicators including BOD, airborne SO 2 concentrations, heavy metal levels 2 , untreated human waste, and other air and water quality indicators. This focus on pollutants has meant that in much literature there is less emphasis on what others have called degradation. This refers to the effects of uninternalized externalities seen in soil erosion, congestion, open access resource and other problems, where physical emissions are less the problem. The paper argues that to discuss environmental problems in developing countries (or to compare them with those in developed countries) without reference to these problems is incomplete; their effects are large and pervasive, and their severity and interaction with economic process often differs sharply from that of pollutants.
The second point is in many ways an elaboration of the first. We have attempted to review studies of the social costs associated with incomplete internalization of the externalities we list. The studies that are available are limited in both country and item coverage, and, in addition, do not always use consistent methodologies, but the picture they paint is that such costs seem large (perhaps in excess of 10% of GDP on an annual basis in some countries), and that these costs are dominated by degradation rather than pollutant effects (perhaps ¾ of the total effect). One implication we draw is that with large cost estimates of inaction, environmental policy in developing countries should perhaps have a higher ranking than currently, especially if these cost estimates substantially exceed those of inaction with regard to more conventional policy reform such as tax or trade policy. The other is that if the balance of costs is skewed more to degradation than to the effects of pollutants, degradation should perhaps receive more attention in the literature.
Our third point concerns the relationship between growth, policy reform and environmental quality, and comparisons of the environmental situation either across economies or through time in light of our characterization of the developing country environmental regime.
To the extent that recent literature focuses on differences in outcomes across countries or over time in terms of levels of various environmental indicators, the issue is whether degradation effects can give a different picture. We argue that degradation impacts could well behave differently from pollutants; soil erosion problems, for instance, seem to progressively recede as income per capita rises, since the population in agriculture falls and plot sizes rise; while outward oriented trade policies draw labor into urban areas from rural areas, adding to congestion. We discuss literature on the environmental Kuznets curve (Shafik and Bandopadhyay (1992) for the 3 1992 World Development Report, Grossman and Kreuger (1995) , and Andreoni and Levinsohn (1998) ) and recent literature on trade and environment Taylor (1994, 1995) ) and (Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor (1998) ). While authors contributing to these literatures are clear in labeling their analyses to be primarily of pollutant levels, users of this research naturally tend to think of the results as giving guidance on the wider environmental situation in the countries discussed, and without explicit reference to degradation effects the picture once again can be incomplete.
In its final section, the paper concludes by arguing that welfare gains from moving to full internalization would seem to be the more appropriate comparative measure of severity of environmental problems across countries (or changes through time). The studies referred to in the text seem to suggest that internalization gains relative to GDP are significant for developing countries (and probably larger than for developed countries) raising the issue of why a higher degree of internalization has not occurred. We discuss briefly whether this outcome reflects income elasticities of demand for environmental quality above one; or whether it reflects technology and capital intensity of environmental management and policy enforcement, so that abatement costs in developing countries are the barrier. We also touch on the role of political structure in these countries; and whether a key problem is also in defining and enforcing property rights. In the process we discuss the links between poverty and degradation taken up by Maler (1997) .
In concluding, the paper discusses the implications of our characterization of the developing country environmental regime for environmental policy in these countries. Can developed country policy regimes be simply transferred, or are there special features that need to be taken into account? Degradation, property rights, and compliance issues seem to be more prominent than for developed countries. We note in passing that the developing countries in which these regimes occur are far from a homogenous group of countries. They vary by per capita income, GDP growth rates, size, the volume and pattern of their international trade, their degrees of urbanization, and many other characteristics. They also vary in the form their environmental problems take; some countries are heavily endowed with environmental assets such as tropical forests 3 , while others are arid and desert; some are mountainous, others are low lying and flood prone. Generalizing across all developing countries and categorizing the environmental regimes they each face is thus difficult.
A few generalizations seem to hold, though: lower income countries have proportionately more significant agricultural and rural sectors, for instance.
Elements of the Regime
Notwithstanding these problems, in Table 1 we have set out what we see as the main elements in our characterization of the environmental regime in developing countries using the broad categories of pollutants and degradation discussed above.
Pollutants in the form of toxic contaminants cover effluents of various types which come largely from mines, chemical production, pulp and paper plants, and leather and tanning A second category of pollutant based externality problems are those associated with water quality and untreated fluid waste. It is common in many countries for there to be untreated sewage discharges into rivers, streams and open ditches. The 1998 HDR suggests that as much as 50% of all discharges into waterways in developing countries are untreated. These in turn generate significant health problems, including water borne diseases, which in some countries are rife. The HDR estimates that diarrhoea and dysentery account for an estimated 20% of the total burden of disease in developing countries; that polluted water generates nearly two billion cases of diarrhoea annually in the developing world, and diarrhoea related diseases cause deaths of some 5 million people annually, including 3 million children. They also estimate that contaminated water leads to 900 million cases of intestinal worms and 200 million cases of schistosomiasis, and that Asian rivers carry 50 times as many bacteria from human excrement as is the case in European/North American countries. 4 High levels of arsenic linked to phosphoric fertilizers in ground water killing some of the people who drink such water is a further problem in a number of countries.
A further component of the pollutant category is domestic solid waste. In most developing countries there are only limited solid waste disposal systems and the result is the spread of infectious diseases. The 1998 HDR estimates that between 20 and 50 % of domestic solid waste in these countries remains uncollected, even with up to one half of local government spending in some countries going on waste collection. In some areas, given the lack of sanitation, waste 9 becomes mixed with excrement further contributing to the spread of infectious disease.
Uncollected domestic waste is the most common cause of blocked urban drainage channels in Asian cities, which in turn increases the risk of flooding and water borne disease. Poorer households in these countries tend to live near waste disposal sites.
Health related problems (which include respiratory damage, heart and lung disease and cancer) due to smoke from burning, and vehicle exhaust in both urban and rural areas reflect another pollutant-based element of the environmental regime. In lower income countries, these problems come from burning dung, wood and crop residues. The 1998 HDR estimates that 90% of deaths globally due to air pollution are in the developing world, and of those 80% are due to indoor pollution.
Of the elements of degradation that we identify as part of the environmental regime in developing countries, soil erosion is a major component; although to identify the externality related component one has to differentiate between on site and off site effects. Erosion arises from a variety of causes. One is population growth which results in progressive division of plot sizes, with spillover of topsoil into neighbouring plots, river estuaries, hydro dams, and, in the case of more heavily desert countries, wind borne soil loss. The 1998 HDR estimates that in Bakina Faso and Mali one person in six has been forced to leave their land as it has turned into desert; and that desertification has a world-wide annual cost of $42 billion in lost income, $9 billion of which arise in Africa. Soil erosion reduces agricultural productivity and in some cases agricultural lands availability per capita. Soil erosion has also had the effect of reducing fodder available for cattle.
A recent survey paper on studies of the cost of soil erosion in developing countries (Barbier (1996) ) places the annual losses by country in a range from 1 to 15% of GDP . Knut et.al. (1996) in a study of Nicaragua estimate annual productivity losses due to soil erosion by crop in coffee of 1.26%, beans 2.52%, maize 2.41%, and sorghum 1.35%. Magrath and Arens (1989) in a study of soil erosion losses in Java in 1985, estimate annual losses of around 4% of the value of crops harvested. Cruz, Francisco, and Conway (1988) In closing this discussion we also note that the environmental regime in developing countries is characterized by policy measures which frequently exhibit lax enforcement. As in the developed world, the primary form that developing country environmental policy towards industrial emissions takes is the use of command and control instruments of various forms.
These involve the setting of standards, monitoring (with penalties for violators), but a common feature is the presence of only limited compliance due to weak enforcement. For household waste water, soil erosion and other non-industrial environmental problems there is little or no abatement of damage in many countries.
The Costs of Environmental Damage in Developing Countries
If this is the regime, what are its consequences? In Table 2 we report some estimates of the costs of environmental damage for a number of countries, each associated with the elements of the regime we identify. Cost estimates of this form are relatively few and are scattered over the literature. The methods and data used to construct them are not always fully available, and have a variance in their findings. Most of these estimates do not directly refer to the welfare costs of the environmental damage, but instead use some other measure (such as value of work time loss due to health impacts). We rely here heavily on a synthesis of studies of environmental damage for a sample of Asian economies that have recently been drawn together by the Asian Development Bank, and are reported in the 1998 HDR. These together with results of a related study by the World Resources Institute, are cited in Table 2 .
In the case of China, the ADB studies suggest that annual productivity losses due to soil erosion, deforestation and land degradation could be as high as 7% of GDP for the early 1990's.
If the health and productivity losses from pollution in cities are added (in the region of 1. The other studies included in Table 2 Table 3 reports estimated time loss costs from traffic congestion for a sample of Asian cities. These are also cited in the 1998 HDR, and are in addition to those costs listed in Table 2 .
For Bangkok time related costs from traffic are estimated at 2% of local product in 1994; these estimates fall to 0.4% for Seoul in the same year. Health related costs of traffic are already included in studies referred to in Table 2 . Source: WRI (1996) and UN (1998) What is striking from these two sets of studies is that in the case of the two more comprehensive country studies (China and India), estimates for combined environmental damage are large; in the region of 10% of GDP in the China case, neglecting damage from additional sources such as time loss in traffic. Given that model based analyses of the gains from more conventional policy reform (such as tax or trade reform) in those countries often produce estimates which are lower (perhaps 1-3% of GDP), this suggests that environmental policy should perhaps receive a higher weighting in the over policy stance in these countries than currently.
In addition, the composition of environmental damage costs in these countries is striking.
The China studies in the ADB compendium suggest that perhaps 70-80% of environmental damage occurs through degradation, largely in rural areas; a range echoed in the study by Smil we cite above. While the numbers for India are perhaps less dramatic, the high estimates of costs of soil erosion outside Asia 7 , to us at least, support our contention that degradation of the environment rather than damage caused by pollutants may well be the more important environmental issue in developing countries.
Transborder Environmental Externalities and the Developing Country Environmental Regime
Developing countries both contribute to and are affected by a range of transborder and global externality problems. In Table 4 we list some of the more major transborder and global environmental externalities involved, both those affecting and contributed to by developing countries. These also form part of the typical developing country environmental regime, and although we do not emphasize them here we mention them nonetheless. Further transborder elements forming part of the environmental regime in these countries include the thinning of the ozone layer which increases ultraviolet light penetration of the atmosphere. These effects are more severe in developed country temperate climates than in the developing countries, but the ability of the developing countries to abate damage of this form is more limited than that in the developed world; especially as much of the population spends a larger fraction of their time out of doors.
We also include problems associated with biodiversity and deforestation as a part of the transborder/global part of the regime. For biodiversity, the issue is loss from the gene pool through flora/fauna damage. The environmental effects of economic activities which affect resources with global existence value (including species and biodiversity) is one aspect. Shrimp farming, for instance, has grown in the last two decades from initially low levels in Thailand and other countries, and with it has come significant loss of mangroves and a resulting loss of biodiversity. Many pharmaceutical products sold worldwide each year are generated from forest related sources in developing countries. Global impacts of forest loss occur through many channels including carbon sink reduction and impacts on existence value abroad. But there are also the effects of forest loss on local populations who use non-timber forest products; and increased water runoff in the event of flooding.
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Acid rain problems reflect airborne acid depositions affecting buildings and agricultural yields; these problems are especially significant in such areas as South and East China, North and East India, Korea and Thailand. The 1998 HDR reports that areas in India close to sulfur dioxide emissions (admittedly mostly originating within India) are estimated to have halved wheat yields due to these emissions. While these global and transborder externalities are also part of the developing country environmental regime, but both their impact on individual countries and the contribution of countries through them to global damage remain poorly quantified.
III. GROWTH, POLICY REFORM AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL REGIME IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The discussion in the previous section emphasizes the wide range of externalities which comprise the environmental regime in developing countries, along with the seeming quantitative dominance of environmental problems associated with degradation more so than with pollutants. 
The Environmental Kuznets Curve
One of the more prominent of the recent discussions on these issues focuses on the so- The implication drawn by some in the literature from EKC plots is that growth need not be inconsistent with the objective of improving environmental quality in the medium to longer run: environmental concerns can be delinked from growth objectives. Indeed, some authors have gone further and argued that the best way to improve environmental quality is to follow policies that make countries rich in the shortest possible time, since in the long run there is no conflict between growth and environmental protection. Andreoni and Levinson (1998) and Jaegar (1999) have recently provided microfoundations for the EKC, arguing that the characteristics of clean-up technology are key to the EKC.
The first paper in this area by Shafik and Bandopadhyay (1992) However, the turning points occurred at much higher levels of income than in the Safik and Bandopadhyay study. Grossman and Krueger (1995) Song. Cooper and Griffiths (1994) , in contrast, estimated three regional (Africa, Latin America and Asia) EKCs for deforestation only, using pooled cross-section, time-series data for each region for the period 1961-91, and for 64 countries. They found no EKC relationship.
These findings are such that it is now often argued that attempts to estimate EKC type relationships should be confined to air pollutants alone, and, in particular, to SO 2 emissions.
As a result, drawing conclusions from any EKC plot as to how overall environment damage behaves as income change is thought to be fraught with problems.
But even for SO 2 , the EKC does not also appear to be a particularly robust description in current literature of the behavior of environmental pollutants vis a vis income per capita. Kaufman et.al. (1998) Unruh and Moomaw (1998) evaluate whether the transition from a high emission to a low emission state occurs mechanically at a particular income level as suggested by earlier papers.
They identify some industrialized countries that seem to have gone through EKC type transitions discovering that these transitions span a broad range of income levels 8 . Furthermore, the transitions occur abruptly and co-temporally, and do not appear to be the consequence of endogenous income growth. Rapid and co-temporal historical events, technological progress and the need to react to external shocks seem to drive the EKC structure. Ekins (1997) 
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Thus, even taken within its own confines, the relation between economic growth and environmental damage seems more complex than that portrayed by the EKC (Barbier (1997) ).
There appears to be nothing automatic about this relation, nor is any inference on causality necessarily justified. Once degradation effects are added in, drawing conclusions as to how overall environmental quality changes with income is even more treacherous. For instance, soil erosion problems, measured relative to aggregate income, would seem to recede as growth occurs, and in (relative terms) the agricultural sector shrinks. But with growth come urbanization and congestion problems, which relative to income perhaps recede after a transitional period when growth and new infrastructure come on stream.
The Environmental Effects of Policy Reform (Trade and Environment)
A further strand of recent literature attempts to assess how environmental quality changes with policy changes, including trade liberalization; in particular how various kinds of pollutant concentrations can be affected. Copeland and Taylor (1994) , for instance, evaluate the role of trade where environmental quality is a local public good (damage from pollutants remain in the country). They consider a two country single period equilibrium, where goods differ in pollution intensity in production. Countries differ in their endowment of a primary factor (human capital); environmental quality in both countries is a normal good in preferences, and with assumed endogenous setting of pollution policy the higher income country has higher environmental standards. They find that free trade shifts pollution intensive production towards human capital scarce countries and raises world pollution levels. Copeland and Taylor (1995) consider a different case where environmental quality is a pure public good to which all countries are exposed. Trade effects are different in this case, since relocation of pollution intensive industries to countries with less stringent environmental protection can increase the exposure of residents in the home country, and works against more conventional gains from trade. Since there are transborder externalities in this case, nationally based pollution regulation does not lead to Pareto Optimality, and free trade need not raise welfare.
More recently, Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor (1998) first generate and then test a series of propositions as to how economies behave in terms of their trade and environment linkages.
They assume a small open economy formulation, the economy has a number of agents, produces two final goods and uses two primary factors. One product is labor intensive and involves no pollution, whereas the other is capital intensive and causes pollution. They assume producers have access to an abatement technology, which, for simplicity, only uses the polluting good as an input. It is also assumed that the government uses emission taxes to reduce pollution, and
given the pollution tax rate they generate a firm level profit function.
The level of the tax actually used is assumed to be an increasing function of what an optimally set tax would be. This treatment allows government behavior to vary across countries, and also allows for environmental policy to respond and differ by country. On the demand side, consumers maximize utility taking pollution as given; they assume preferences over goods are homothetic, while there is constant marginal disutility of pollution.
The model allows them to decompose a total change in pollution levels into scale, composition, and technique effects. This, in turn, allows them to generate a number of theoretical propositions to test. Thus, if economies differ only with respect to their degree of trade openness, if both countries export the polluting good, then pollution will be higher in the country
which is less open. Where the world price is fixed, then for a given level of income and for certain settings of key model parameters, they show that the composition effect associated with trade liberalization in such countries is to increase pollution. These and other propositions as to 
IV. MEASURING THE DEGREE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY ENVIRONMENTAL FAILURE
Given the preceding discussion, if pollutant levels across economies do not provide a complete picture for the evaluation of comparative environmental performance across countries or through time, either in analytical or empirical work, what is a more appropriate way to proceed? Unfortunately, the problem is not only the incomplete coverage of environmental externalities in developing countries; one also needs estimates of damage functions, which allow the losses involved to be computed in welfare terms. Thus, even if economies have high levels of emissions per capita, if the ability to abate differs across economies (such as health care capabilities to deal with adverse effects of emissions) then differences in emission levels across countries do not necessarily map into comparable differential welfare losses due to environmental failures. In the appendix to the paper, we show for the special case of a stock externality that, even if an EKC relationship is followed in emissions per capita, this need not map into a comparable relationship in terms of welfare.
For these reasons, therefore, some alternative approach is needed to evaluate the significance of environmental failures across economies or through time, and hence to assess the impact of the environmental regime in developing countries. The appropriate concept to us would seem to be a distance measure reflecting the severity of departures from Pareto optimality associated with externalities; how far away are economies from Pareto optimality in a welfare sense, and what would be the potential welfare gains from moving from the current allocation of resources with uninternalized or partially internalized externalities to complete internalization.
The implied measure would seem to be a money metric measure (say a Hicksian measure) of the gain from internalization relative to a current non internalized equilibrium. Income effects associated with different assignments of property rights would affect the precise fully internalized equilibrium, although we put these issues on one side for now. Such a measure of gain is implicit in the literature discussed in section II, which produces estimates of the costs of various kinds of environmental failures in terms of GDP per capita; but much of this literature is not explicit about the precise welfare formulation used.
Such measures need not behave in any way which is necessarily collinear with levels of emissions, or intensity of environmental failure. Figure 1 shows schematically how a comparison across two economies with differing levels of emissions may yield larger gains to the economy with smaller emissions. Here, we represent marginal benefit and marginal cost of abatement functions for two economies. Economy A has more steeply sloped functions, and in Pareto optimality has smaller abatement than B. But the gains from abatement (internalization) are larger in A than in B because of the more shallowly sloped functions in B. Comparing pollutant levels across economies need give no guide as to the relative size of gains from internalization.
The seemingly large estimates we report earlier of the gains from internalizing environmental externalities in developing countries also suggest the perhaps obvious question of why is it that if internalization gains are so large, more internalization has not occurred. It would be wrong to say that no internalization has occurred in these countries. At village level, terracing and other schemes are designed to remedy some of the ills of soil erosion. National environmental regulation often approaches levels of stringency seen in regulation in developed countries, but is accompanied by problems of enforcement and compliance. In many developing countries, environmental NGO groups are also extremely active, generating a rising profile for environmental issues in local policy debate even though large potential gains from internalization still seem to remain. Various explanations abound for the presence of these seemingly large potential gains.
One is that the technology of internalization is both capital intensive and high cost for low income countries. Monitoring devices, administration of environmental fees and fines all require inputs on a scale not easily attained in low income countries. Another is that if environmental quality is costly to provide, then models with traditional preferences and technology would naturally imply that abatement levels are lower in low income countries. These effects, in turn, would be exacerbated by income elasticities of demand for environmental quality exceeding one, as is often claimed.
Another direction explored in recent literature (see Lopez (1997b) and Maler (1997) ) is that it is outside shocks to social systems that are a significant compounding factor, either disrupting or delaying internalization and producing lowered environmental quality. Particularly important in this discussion is the observation that environmental management systems in developing countries commonly rely on informal social norms, which can partially or wholly break down under rapid population growth, technological innovation, or changes in market outcomes. Previously reasonably well-managed resources can become open access poorly managed resources, with worsened environmental quality the result. Dasgupta and Maler (1991) have argued that, viewed in these terms, poverty and degradation can even be reinforcing. Thus, if deforestation moves available firewood from forests progressively further from villages, families may have more children to offset the increased time required to collect firewood 9 .
Population growth is higher, and with it the demand for firewood, producing further degradation.
V. COMPARING DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRY POLICY REGIMES
We often tend to think of developing countries as following the developmental experience of developed countries with a form of compressed lag. OECD countries over some 200 There are, however, some key differences in the developing country experience in this area compared to the industrial revolution of old. First, the time periods involved are compacted, and hence the flow environmental damage per year during industrialization is larger. Second, the shocks which hit the economies are also much more severe than was true of the old industrial revolutionizers. These latter economies simply did not experience population growth rates of 3%/year plus, massive growth in urban vehicle densities, and other elements contributing to todays environmental ills in the developing world. Not only is the process more compact, the severity of damage time adjusted probably exceeds that experienced in the OECD one hundred years ago. Third, even though weakly administered, there are abatement technologies which can and are being employed, and even though there is political opposition, environmental management is taking root.
Thus the large cost estimates we report earlier, an the scope of developing country environmental problems suggest to us a much more activist environmental policy regime will continue to emerge in developing countries than was true of industrial countries some hundred years ago as they grew and industrialized. And unlike the past, this will have an equal if not dominant focus on degradation over pollution. Having developed this picture of the environmental regime in the developing countries the paper concludes by suggesting that a measure is needed of overall environmental performance in terms of departures from Pareto optimality so as to give a money metric welfare measure of the internalization gains of moving to complete internalization. It also discusses some of the reasons for the lack of internalization, citing recent literature which argues that social conventions defining implicit management regimes come under stress as rapid urbanization, rapid population growth, and other shocks to social systems occur. The overall theme of the paper, repeated throughout, is than in discussing the environmental situation in developing countries, a more comprehensive sense of what comprises this regime is needed. ( 2) where b is fixed.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The social planner's problem is to choose non negative consumption and emission paths that solve the infinite horizon maximization problem:
subject to (1) and (2) . Here U(.) is the instantaneous utility of the representative consumer and ρ is the discount rate.
The Hamiltonian for this problem is:
, ( economy. From the first order conditions we can solve for optimal consumption and optimal emissions as: c* = c(k, S, θ 1 ,θ 2 ) and e* = e(k, S,θ 1 ,θ 2 ). If we assume that the production and the utility functions are strictly concave in this case then for given values of parameters, c* and e* would be unique. The EKC in this case refers to the relationship between c* and e*;
the issue is how this may be expected to vary with c. If we use the above result on θ 2 then it follows that, from a welfare point of view, the relationship between consumption and emissions would be monotonically falling. Richer countries would have higher θ 2 and, therefore, lower emissions, ceteris paribus, than poorer countries.
In a competitive market economy the representative consumer takes as given time paths {w(t), r(t), π(t)} for tε [0,∞), of wages, interest rates, and profits. The instantaneous utility of the consumer is defined by U(c,S) as before. The consumer sells the fixed labour input (normalized to unity) to a representative firm at the market-determined wage rate, and rents out capital (k(t)) at the market rate of interest to the firm. The representative firm maximizes profits under competitive conditions. It generates emissions e(t) per unit time and pays a tax λ(t) on these emissions. Total tax proceeds collected by the government are redistributed to the consumer. The consumer maximizes utility and has perfect foresight about market wage rates and other variables.
The consumer maximizes:
and treats S as a parameter. ρ is the consumer's discount rate and δ is the rate of depreciation of capital.
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The firm takes as given (and has perfect foresight about) time paths of emission taxes {λ(t), t ε [0,∞)} along with the times paths of wage and interest. The firm can reduce its tax liabilities by reducing output. Output is produced according to a standard neoclassical production function so that the firm chooses k(t) and e(t) to solve the problem:
Max π(t) = f(k(t),e(t)) -r(t)k(t) -λ(t)e(t)
Given that the consumer perfectly predicts the time paths of {w(t), r(t), π(t)} and the firm perfectly predicts the time paths of {w(t), r(t), π(t)}, then the consumer will determine consumption demand (c d ) and capital supply (k s ) whereas the firm will determine consumption supply (c s ) and capital demand (k d ) and the emissions e(t). The paths {w(t), r(t), π(t), λ(t)} are a perfect foresight competitive equilibrium with emission taxes if the solution {c s (t), k d (t), e(t)} of the FP is such that if profits are defined by π(t) = f(k(t),e(t)) -r(t)k(t) -λ(t)e(t) for each t and if {c d (t), k s (t)} solves the CP then for all tε [0,∞) we have:
(i) c d (t) = c s (t) goods market or flow equilibrium;
(ii) k s (t) = k d (t) capital market or stock equilibrium;
(iii) e c (t) is the competitive emission; An examination of the planner's problem in (1) immediately reveals that if the emission tax is defined as λ(t) = -θ 2 (t)/θ 1 (t), the competitive equilibrium solution for CP and the firm's FP are identical to the solution of the social optimization problem. To see this, assume that the FP has an interior solution, then we must have:
∂f/∂k = r (10) ∂f/∂e = λ
